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Abstract
This study adds to prior work on the production of accounting rules
(Francis, 1987; Nobes, 1992; Brown and Feroz, 1992; Saemann, 1995;
Pong and Whittington, 1996; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; Bhimani, 2008;
Ramanna, 2008; Stenka and Taylor, 2010; Giner and Arce, 2012; Joris-
sen et al., 2012, 2013) by analysing the social psychology of standard
setters. It complements work analysing the impact of psychological
factors on standard setting (Hirschleifer and Teoh, 2009; Allen and
Ramanna, 2013), finding that group effects (Bartel and Wiesenfeld,
2013; Haslam et al., 2006; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Hogg et al., 1986)
combined with existing project management structures at the IASB
to undermine the IASB Liabilities Project. The paper uses interviews
and analyses of IASB documents and board meetings to open up the
black box of the standard setting organisation to reveal the existence of
‘internal lobbying’ within standard setting organisation that rendered
the project vulnerable to external lobbying activities. Such findings
contribute to the existing literature on lobbying and standard setting
by demonstrating the importance of understanding the connection be-
tween lobbying activities and the social processes taking place within
the standard setting organisation when trying to explain regulatory
outcomes. Furthermore, the study addresses the role of technical staff
at the IASB in the process of standard setting through interviews with
almost all the staff who worked on the project as well as several board
members.
Key words: IASB, liabilities, psychology
1. Introduction
Scholars in accounting have acknowledged that standard setting cannot al-
ways be relied upon to produce good regulation (Waymire and Basu, 2008).
Furthermore, the production of “bad rules” may result not just from political
interference or lobbying but also from specific psychological biases or social
processes in the lobbying, professional and user communities (Hirschleifer
and Teoh, 2009). Yet little attention is paid to the people and processes that
produce standards compared with normative studies that assess the concep-
tual and functional adequacy of the final regulatory document.1 The focus of
this study is the social psychological biases and associated social processes
affecting the individuals at the heart of the regulatory machine: the board
members and technical staff at accounting standard setting organisations.
While embracing the role of factors relating to individual psychology as
drivers of regulatory change, this study highlights the role of social psychology,
in particular, group effects on the outcome of a recent IASB project. This was
the Liabilities Project, which was intended to revise the methods employed
for reporting obligations for which estimation uncertainty existed, such as
pending litigations and clean-up costs for environmental damage. It proposed
new rules for recognition and measurement, which reflected a trend towards
the increased emphasis on balance sheet recognition and the use of economic
methods for measurement.2 However, in 2010, the uncompleted project was
withdrawn from the standard setting agenda. Interview and documentary
evidence suggests that group effects exerted a considerable influence on the
outcome of the Liabilities Project. This study finds that knowledge of the
organisational character of the IASB is an essential part of an explanation
of the outcome of the Liabilities Project. This is because the IASB is not
merely a technical and monolithic entity; it is social entity and, as such,
the actions and behaviour of its board and its staff are coordinated by their
perceived social identity and group affiliations. Research that fails to take into
account the social psychological effects in standard setting processes may miss
important factors driving the production of accounting rules. For example,
intergroup conflict and group effects, or ‘internal lobbying’ between sub-groups
on the board with competing accounting ideologies was observed. This led
to non-compliance with accepted due process which offered opportunities to
external constituents to block the project.
Drawing on theories of social psychology, this study finds that group
1Although, see Allen and Ramanna (2013) and Jiang et al. (2014) who identify specific
characteristics of individual board members as indicators of likely voting behaviour.
2The IASC, FASB and ASB had already introduced similar recognition and measurement
criteria based on financial economics into the reporting of pensions and financial derivatives.
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effects within the IASB board (Bartel and Wiesenfeld, 2013; Haslam et al.,
2006; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Hogg et al., 1986) led to a tendency towards
the polarisation of views between an influential subgroup on the board that
advocated the use of fair value accounting and the other board members. This
subgroup of five board members, the ‘fair value group’ shared common beliefs
about the appropriateness of fair value approaches to financial reporting. The
term ‘fair value accounting’ will be used in this paper to refer to the use of
measurement approaches using the board members’ interpretation of financial
economics. This approach to measurement was associated with an emphasis
on assets and liabilities. In explaining this shift, Chakravarthy (2014) argues
that the increased commitment to this new approach to accounting was
associated with an increased homogenisation of the views of the FASB board
members after the publication of the Conceptual Framework. The influence of
financial economics is not restricted to recognition and measurement issues in
financial reporting, but may apply equally to the financialisation of narrative
reporting (Chahed, 2014).
Furthermore, project management structures at the IASB enabled the
fair value group to push items onto the agenda and shape the development,
and the outcome, of the project. Such findings not only help explain this
particular standard setting case but also contribute to the existing literature
on lobbying (for example Giner and Arce, 2012; Jorissen et al., 2012, 2013)
by demonstrating that, in addition to the internal lobbying by subgroups on
the board, external lobbyists can respond tactically to perceived procedural
errors, thereby undermining a project by invoking due process criticisms.
The paper contributes to the existing literature on standard setting in two
ways. First, it opens up the ‘black box’ of the standard setting organisation to
reveal the existence of a subgroup on the board, and associated group effects,
on which there has been limited focus to date ( Allen and Ramanna (2013),
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009) and Young (1994, 1996)). Second, it reveals
that inter-group activity on the board, which can be thought of as ‘internal
lobbying’, rendered the project vulnerable to external lobbying activities.
Both the existence of internal lobbying and the extent to which external
lobbying is tactical and responsive to the procedures followed by standard
setters have until now been overlooked in the accounting literature. It should
be noted that while this paper draws on the social psychology literature,
specifically that research addressing group effects, it is not intended to make
a contribution to the literature on social psychology beyond providing an
empirical case study of group effects within the regulatory environment of
financial reporting standard setting. It is, however, novel in its application of
social psychology to the process of production of accounting standards.
The study is subject to certain methodological limitations, which are
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explored further in Section 4. These relate to the reliability of evidence
used and the fact that, as a single case study, its findings are not obviously
generaliseable to other standard setting projects. Nevertheless, given that
the study analyses decision-making by board members who worked on many
other projects over time, the very same social processes uncovered for this
particular case are likely to be relevant for explaining the social processes at
work for other projects.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I briefly
contextualise the case by summarising the antecedent conditions and the
chronological development of the IASB Liabilities Project. In Section 3, I
introduce literature from social psychology and accounting relevant to this
case. In Section 4, I describe the research methods used in this study. In
Section 5, I provide documentary and interview evidence about the internal
IASB culture and the IASB experience of lobbying against the Liabilities
Project. In Section 6, I analyse the extent to which the evidence lends
support to the hypothesis that social psychological factors made the IASB
vulnerable to a particular kind of lobbying activity and suggest potentially
fruitful avenues for future research.
2. The Liabilities Project
The Liabilities Project proposed changes to the rules for recognising and
measuring uncertain non-financial obligations. It originally arose out of a need
to ensure convergence with US GAAP in 20023, but a group of board members
at the IASB became concerned about inconsistencies between the treatment
of liabilities in IAS 37 and those in other International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRSs).4 These board members argued that the probable outflow
test in IAS 37 led to potentially misleading and un-objective reporting. In the
view of a long-serving IASB board member, IAS 37 gave “weird” results in
practice.5 This board member argued that the existing rules enabled preparers
to understate liabilities by claiming that an existing obligation failed the
probability of outflow test which allowed them to argue that they should not
be recognised on the balance sheet. Furthermore, disclosure practices have
3In an IASB meeting in July 2002, the IASB board identified inconsistencies between
FASB Statement 146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities and
the IASB approach formalised in IAS 37 and IAS 19 (b). These inconsistencies related to
the treatment of restructuring costs; a lower threshold for recognition existed under IFRS
than under US GAAP.
4It should be noted that there was no intention at this stage to attempt a convergence
between IAS 37 and its U.S. equivalent, SFAS 5.
5This view was expressed by Interviewee-2.
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been found to be deficient indicators of the probability of loss (Hennes, 2014).
For recognition, the new proposals removed the existing probability-
of-outflow recognition test and in its place, introduced the concept of an
unconditional “stand-ready obligation”. A preparer would have a “stand
ready obligation” if it was aware that it may have triggered an obligation,
even if the probability of outflows was low. The example of such a stand-ready
obligation, often cited in IASB literature is that of a burger vendor who has
negligently sold potentially poisonous burgers to customers. Thus, the stand-
ready obligation reflects some culpability on the part of the preparer, even if
financial penalties are unlikely to be imposed. Alternatively, an unconditional
obligation might result from an ongoing responsibility to service warranty
obligations.
Measurement issues were also addressed by the Liabilities Project. Advo-
cates of changes to IAS 37 argued that the standard was interpreted incorrectly
by many preparers who believed that expected values should be used only for
large populations and not for single events. For single events, preparers tended
to assume that the “individual most likely outcome” should be taken as the
best estimate, even though other possible outcomes might affect the value
(ibid ¶40).6 The new rules addressed measurement ambiguity by removing
the distinction between large populations of items (such as warranties) and
one-off items (such as individual law suits against companies). It called for
the use of expected values in all cases.7 Figure C.1 shows the chronological
development of the project and Appendix A details the IASB meetings at
which the Liabilities Project was discussed.
Two exposure drafts were issued, the first on recognition in 2005 and
the second, on measurement, in 2010 attracting negative feedback from
constituents. The project did not result in the publication of a revised
standard. After the November 2010 meeting, work on the project ceased
with the IASB stating that: “the board will schedule future deliberations
based on priorities with other projects, but expect to further deliberate in
2011”. The project was removed from the agenda and listed as “paused”,
but recently has been added to the IASB work programme as a research
project. 8 A senior IASB board member acknowledged that the project had
6However, the advocates of change pointed out that the standard qualifies this require-
ment by stating that the likely outcome is the appropriate measure unless others are mainly
higher or mainly lower. The most likely outcome equates to the expected value whenever
the distribution of probable outcomes is symmetrical and single-peaked.
7Some have argued that the IASB confused the concepts of measurement and estimation.
As such, they tried to “position expected value as a method for determining a meaningful
measure” which was “invalid” because no observable measurement attribute existed (Barker
and McGeachin, 2013, pg.594).
8In 2012, IAS 37 was moved off the current projects agenda and onto the research
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been “shelved” in 2010 (Interviewee-7). The decision to ‘shelve’ the project
effectively constitutes a failure by its advocates to publish a new standard
during their term of office on the IASB board. This paper attributes this
outcome in part to the effect of social psychological factors.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
3. Influences on standard setting
Much academic research on standard setting has focused on the role of
lobbyists in driving the production of accounting standards (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1978; Brown, 1982; Hope and Briggs, 1982; Hope and Gray, 1982;
Sutton, 1984; Francis, 1987; Nobes, 1992; Brown and Feroz, 1992; Saemann,
1995; Pong and Whittington, 1996; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; Bhimani, 2008;
Ramanna, 2008; Stenka and Taylor, 2010; Jorissen et al., 2013; Georgiou and
Jack , 2015; Pelger, 2015). These authors analyse the influence of external
interest groups and social norms on regulatory outputs. They either focus on
the standard setting organisation as a whole or on the voting behaviour of
individual board members. By contrast, this paper argues that a group of
individuals on the IASB board exerted significant influence over the standard
setting process, what I label ‘internal lobbying’. For the case of the Liabilities
Project, this internal lobbying led to actions that invited external lobbying
activity as response to an alleged weakness in due process.
Other scholars have argued that accounting change derives from more
complex social and political interactions. In this regard, Cooper and Robson
(2006) argue that overt power conflicts constitute only one part of the process
of regulation with the result that the notion of ‘interests’ can be overused
in research into accounting regulation. They point to the fact that limited
attention has been focused on the structures in which regulatory agencies
are situated, thereby highlighting the importance of relationships between
organisations and their members. This study responds to the concern about
interests, by tracing the factors that shaped the theoretical commitments
of particular groups within the IASB and the effects of this on regulatory
outcomes. In a similar vein, other scholars have identified the impact of
political struggle on accounting and reporting policy (Cooper and Sherer,
1984; Puxty et al., 1987), other social forces of change in calculative norms
(Bhimani, 1987) and the mediating role of accounting (Willmott et al., 1992).
agenda. At the time of writing, the project was paused but public consultations were
planned for 2015. See http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/ Liabilities-
and-Equity/Pages/Non-financial-liabilities.aspx.
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More recently, some researchers have analysed the existence of particular
attitudes to accounting issues, such as the adoption of IFRS or the increased
use of fair value accounting. Durocher and Gendron (2014) have demonstrated
a lack of cognitive unity in the professional accounting community about fair
value accounting, consistent with an ideological commitment to fair value
among many users of IFRS (Durocher and Gendron, 2011).
Another approach to explaining regulatory outputs focuses on the standard
setting entity itself, by studying the role of individual board members of
standard setting organisations. In this regard, Allen and Ramanna (2013)
analyse the voting behaviour of individual board members of the Financial
Accounting Standards board (FASB) and identify a correlation between voting
behaviour and individual professional experience. Implicit in this finding is
the assumption that some causal mechanism that drives voting outcomes
operates at the level of the individual standard setter, although Allen and
Ramanna (2013) do not explore this mechanism as their work is explicitly
individualistic in its focus.
The normative influences on standard setters have also been explored
using institutional approaches. Young (1994) explores institutional influences
on the board members, which stem from the fact that they operate within
a ‘regulatory space’ and dominated by norms of best practice within this
‘space’. Young argues that decisions by standard setters cannot be properly
explained by the consequentialist, rational choice theories that have been
invoked by some scholars within the lobbying literature (for example Watts
and Zimmerman, 1979) as these approaches erroneously assume that the
“actor is separate from the environment” (Young, 1994, pg. 104) rather than
partially constructed by it. This approach conceptualises the individual as
the channel through which a dominant institutional logic flows, rather than
as an autonomous decision-maker. In later work, Young (2014) considers
the reasons why standard setters might describe technical arguments by
constituents as more “pure” in some sense than due process criticisms as a
means of obscuring the fundamentally political basis of standard setting.
Outside the accounting literature, organisational theories address issues
of board activities. From an individualistic and often rational perspective,
economic team theory (Marschak and Radner, 1959) extends expected utility
theory to organisational settings, addressing questions about decision making
within groups where no conflict of interest exists. However, in the case of the
IASB, I find evidence of decision-making that appears to be less than fully
‘rational’, suggesting that the neo-classical approach is deficient for this case.
Furthermore, economic team theory is primarily normative and has been
subject to criticisms concerning its descriptive value (MacCrimmon, 1974). By
contrast, group theory demonstrates the potential irrationality of particular
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forms of group behaviour based on psychological and heuristic-based decision
processes which more closely describe the way people actually behave.
Other work in organisational theory, known as ‘board dynamics theory’
focuses on identifying processes that show how boards actually work rather
than how they ought to work, or how they would work if they were rational.
Such theories attempt to explain the outcome of board processes by assuming
that boards are groups of interacting individuals (Forbes and Milliken, 1999)
with the result that board composition, the skill sets of individual board
members and even their emotions can drive decision-making. While the
emphasis on description of processes is a central part of such research, this
study does not take an individualistic approach, and instead views the IASB
board (and technical staff) as members of two groups (fair value and non-fair
value). It focuses on interactions between these groups (rather than between
individuals) as a means of explaining the potentially sub-rational processes
that played a part in undermining the Liabilities Project.
Although theories of boardroom dynamics may help to provide a more
nuanced view of the IASB decision-making process by highlighting the way
in which groups emerge as a result of the power and influence of particular
individuals on the board, they fail to address the impact of group effects.
Some scholars within the board dynamics field have used interview evidence
to support explanations of particular kinds of behaviour by board members
and consequent influences on board processes (Charan, 1998; Pettigrew and
McNulty, 1995; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Pye, 2001). Others, such
as Brundin and Nordqvist (2008), have made calls for further empirical
descriptive research into the way in which boards behave at a ‘micro-level’
(pg. 326). This paper attempts to answer this call by providing evidence of
board processes and the group effects observed at the IASB board.
Indeed, political and sociological approaches to explaining changes in
accounting norms have counterparts in theories that focus on the role of
individual and group psychology. The role of organisational characteristics
in constructing the identities of its members has been researched extensively
in social psychology, particularly in the field of social identity theory (Tajfel,
1978; Turner et al., 1992; Haslam et al., 2006). By explaining the identities
and associated behaviours of individuals and groups, such theories can throw
light on mechanisms of accounting change.
In this paper, I draw on social identity theory as a means of explaining
the behaviour of IASB board members, in particular by investigating the
division of the IASB board into two different factions, those who were ideo-
logically committed to fair value accounting and those who were not. Work
in social psychology has examined various sources of group affiliation and
the behavioural effects of groups and inter-group conflict in organisational
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settings. The formation of groups within social structures has been explained
by theories of social identity and self-categorisation. According to theories of
social identity, individuals in a social setting may categorise themselves as
members of some particular group, which can be contrasted with a distinct
‘outgroup’ (Tajfel, 1972; Billing and Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1978). The produc-
tion of a common group perspective is also associated with mutual social
influence (Turner and Oakes, 1989). The self-categorisation of an individual
as a member of an ingroup will be expected to result in “category-congruent
behaviour”(Hogg and Abrams, 1988, pg. 21). This will often be combined
with an “accentuation of similarities between self and other ingroupers” and
also to “differences between self and outgroupers” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988,
pg. 21).
Experimental work in social psychology has shown that the sense of iden-
tification with an ‘ingroup’ may cause the individual to emphasise differences
between the ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’, as a means of raising self-esteem (Hogg
et al., 1986). What is of particular relevance to organisational settings is
that ingroupers will strive to reach agreement with other group members.
This achieves coordination through the process of “identifying shared beliefs,
specifying frames of reference, articulating background knowledge, clarifying
points of disagreement and exchanging relevant information” (Haslam, 2004;
Ibarra and Andrews, 1993; Lembke and Wilson, 1998, pg.36). An exemplar of
the group ideal, known as a prototype, will guide norms of behaviour (Bartel
and Wiesenfeld, 2013, pg 505). Experimental results have also shown that
group effects can lead group members to remain committed to apparently
failing projects (Haslam et al., 2006). Self-categorisation and group identity
have been linked to sub-optimal processes of group decision-making labelled
‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1972), associated with an exaggerated sense of the invul-
nerability of the group and the power and moral worth of the ingroup. In
addition, it is associated with negative stereotyping of outgroup leaders, reluc-
tance to amend prior beliefs given new evidence and demonstrably conformist
behaviour. Janis (1972) finds that groupthink tends to occur in situations
where a high level of group cohesiveness exists as well as a lack of impartiality
in leadership and a high-pressure environment.
Evidence from the case of the Liabilities Project, presented in Section 5,
suggests that issues of social identity, self-categorisation and inter-group
conflict existed at the IASB and may have exerted some influence on the
outcome of the Liabilities Project. Although many of the members of the fair
value group possessed a firm commitment to fair value accounting (and quasi
fair value) approaches when they joined the IASB, the views of the group
became polarised from those of the non-fair value group. Furthermore, the
fair value group displayed high levels of confidence, associated with a casual
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attitude to due process.
The presence of the fair value group was associated with internal lobbying
within the IASB, such that the direction of regulation was driven not only
by the objectives of the IASB board overall, the conceptual framework and
external lobbyists, but also by ingroup and intergroup processes within the
standard setting organisation itself. Although certain individuals on the IASB
board, such as Jim Leisenring and Mary Barth, were especially persuasive
and demonstrated strong rhetorical skills in board discussions, I argue that
their power and influence over the initiation and development of the project
arose as a result of their operation as part of a group.
4. Research Methods
In order to explain the withdrawal of the Liabilities Project, I drew on evidence
from IASB documents, interviews with key players in the Liabilities Project
and recordings of board meetings.
First, I conducted a detailed analysis of documents published by the IASB
relating to the project, including staff papers, exposure drafts, minutes of
board meetings, webinars and comment letters received after the two exposure
drafts. Figure ?? provides details of the interviews carried out for this project.
Reliance on these publicly available documents alone may be problematic
though, as the documents may be subject to misinterpretation or may omit
references to important evidence. This may result in a failure to identify
correctly those factors which influenced the timing and outcome of the project.
Second, to mitigate this issue of the interpretation of documentary ev-
idence, I carried out semi-structured interviews with fourteen individuals
who were able to offer particular insights into the social psychology of the
standard setting organisation or the development of the project. Eight of the
interviewees worked for the IASB during the lifetime of the project. Of these,
three were technical staff working directly on the project, one was a senior
technical staff member and four were board members. The interview duration
varied between one and two hours and all interviews were transcribed. Of
the remaining six non-IASB interviewees, one was a former IASC board
member who had been involved in IAS 37 and was able to throw light on
the process of standard development. Three interviewees were involved in
the writing of comment letters for professional organisations, and provided
insights into the methods of lobbying employed. In addition, one interviewee
was a successful applicant to the IASB for a position on the technical staff
(although not necessarily for the Liabilities Project). This interviewee was
able to point to some of the selection criteria applied by the IASB when hiring
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technical staff. In addition the interviewee had attended four board meetings
and was able to comment on the dynamics observed. Taken together, these
interviews reveal particular dynamics and relationships within the IASB that
are not accessible through a documentary analysis alone. The combination of
in-depth documentary analysis with interviews with key actors involved in
the project offers a unique insight into the world of standard setting at the
IASB.
However, weaknesses with interview-based evidence remain. One issue
is the reliability of interview evidence, which may be compromised due to
lapses of memory or commitments by interviewees to represent organisational
views. These potential difficulties were addressed through the triangulation
the multiple oral and textual reports of events. This served to highlight
any factual inconsistencies between accounts provided. Another potential
worry is that interviewees may have felt unable to give an honest account
of events if this might have conflicted with their employers’ non-disclosure
rules or with social norms. As a means of enabling interviewees to talk freely,
I provided assurances of anonymity. Finally, it is difficult to ensure that
the sample of interviewees is representative of the population of potential
interviewees. However, since the sample of interviewees covered most of those
closely involved with the project, this bias is somewhat mitigated.
Third, as a means of further reducing the subjectivity inherent in interview
evidence, I analysed the audio recordings of four board meetings at which
the Liabilities Project was discussed (January 2006, October 2006, January
2007 and April 2000). I had downloaded recordings of three board meetings
from 2006 and 2007 (which were previously available on the IASB website
but have now been removed) and I analysed a later board meeting from
April 2009 which is still currently available on the IASB website.9 This
analysis provides corroboration for statements made by interviewees about
the dominance of certain groups of board members. Given that the recordings
are not annotated, the ability to analyse the discussion by member and group
affiliation requires a researcher who is able to recognise the voices of individual
board members and staff . As I had interviewed many of them, met them
or studied other audio and video materials in which they featured, I was
able to identify the different speakers and record their contribution to the
board discussion. In total, three hours and fifty two minutes of discussion
were analysed. This excludes staff discussion time and cross-talk. As a means
of identifying the existence of any dominance by a group, I analysed the
discussion time between members of the fair value group and those outside
9http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IFRS-Advisory-Council/Meeting-audio-
playback/Archive-audio/Pages/archive-audio.aspx.
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that group as well as minutes of discussion contributed per board members
in the different groups. In addition, I calculated the proportion of times
that a fair value group member came into the discussion as the first speaker
after a staff statement, because this enabled them to shape the subsequent
discussion or potentially crowd out alternative lines of discussion. Finally, the
style of speech was analysed informally, with an emphasis on identifying the
quality of English language used by board members, their assertiveness and
other rhetorical devices employed, such as increased volume or banging on
the table for emphasis. While there is no way of reliably establishing a link
between these styles of argumentation and the resulting decision-making by
the board, it is likely that the statements of persuasive individuals working
in a coordinated fashion towards a particular goal will be more effective than
the actions of weaker orators promoting a set of individual and disparate
views (Mazur and Cataldo , 1989).
Fourth, a potential limitation of this study is that it focuses on a single
case study. It scrutinizes the effects of particular actions of board members
and staff at the IASB on a single standard setting project, although these
board members and staff worked on other projects during their time at the
IASB. It does demonstrate the existence of group effects on the board during
the period from 2002-2010, using evidence from this one case. The nature of
case-based analysis means that one cannot reliably make inferences beyond
this particular case study. Future work could usefully extend the analysis
in this paper to different projects undertaken by the IASB while the fair
value ingroup were in place (such as the financial instruments and insurance
projects) and for projects initiated after 2012 when the last two ingroup
members stood down from the board stood down.10
5. Evidence from the IASB Liabilities Project
Interview and documentary evidence provided in this section supports the
hypothesised existence of social psychological group effects within the IASB
board, which weakened the ability of the IASB to publish revisions to IAS
37 in the expected time-frame. These effects resulted from the existence of
a strong subgroup of board members who advocated what they viewed as a
modern approach to accounting which drew heavily on elements of fair value.
For simplicity, I refer to this group as the ‘fair value accounting group’ or the
‘fair value group’ although this is admittedly a rather crude description of
10These were Warren McGregor and David Tweedie.
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their view.11 This lobbying of the non fair group board members by the fair
value group members can be labelled ‘internal lobbying’. Second, group effects
led the project team to make decisions which made the IASB vulnerable to
responsive actions of the projects’ opponents, which ultimately led to the
removal of the Liabilities Project from the IASB project agenda in November
2010.12
5.1. The ‘fair value group’ at the IASB
From the outset in 2001, the IASB made clear its commitment to providing
users of the financial statements with relevant information for decision-making.
Associated with this, fair value accounting emerged as the dominant aspi-
rational reporting norm among a number of board members. Whether or
not this aspiration was realised in the decade after the founding of the IASB
is not clear. What is clear though, is that the IASB pushed for accounting
rules which moved away from cost based measures and placed an emphasis
on recognition rather than disclosure and the use of economic methods of
measurement.13 These may not have been pure fair value standards, and
may be better described as reflecting a ‘fair value approach’. The use of
fair value accounting has been described as being “implicit in the IASB’s
pronouncements” by Whittington (2008, pg. 39), a former IASB board mem-
ber.14 Overall, board tended to view fair value approaches as the best way to
address a number of different accounting problems.
However, an ideological commitment to ‘fair value accounting’ was not
universal on the board. In fact, the board has been described as being polarised
into two schools of thought: those who favour fair value and the fragmented
set of those who favour range of alternative approaches (Lennard, 2002). In
an interview, a financial analyst stated that the fair value supporters on the
IASB board were “monotheists” who had “a creed” (Interviewee-4). For the
purposes of this study, the existence of fair value accounting ideologues plays
an important part in the explanation of the stalling of the Liabilities Project.
The fair value group on the IASB board subsequently became known as the
‘fair value space cadets’ and stood in opposition to the ‘dinosaurs’ who tended
11It may be more appropriate to refer to this group as the ‘modern accounting group’ or
the ‘pro-financial economics group’ but I will use ‘fair value group’ because this label was
used by those inside and outside the IASB to describe the views of this subgroup, even if
it lacks accuracy.
12The project was subsequently moved to the research agenda in 2012, but no further
work was planned until 2015 when possible revisions would be considered.
13Such standards included IAS 39 for financial instruments which was adopted from the
IASB’s predecessor, the IASC and IAS 19 (a) for pensions.
14Whittington served on the board of the IASB from 2001 to 2006.
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to prefer traditional, historical cost approaches to reporting.15 Specifically,
five of the fourteen (and later, of the fifteen) board members constituted an
ingroup with common beliefs about the benefits of the application of fair
value to accounting problems. Four interviewees (three technical staff and
one board member) identified board members Mary Barth (the academic
member), Jim Leisenring, Warren McGregor, Patricia O’Malley and chairman
David Tweedie as constituting a fair value subgroup of the IASB.16 Although
this group did not always advocate the same approach to each accounting
issue they perceived as problematic, they tended to advocate the recognition
of uncertain items on the balance sheet and the use of fair values for their
measurement as a means to enhance the quality of information in the financial
statements.
Mary Barth, an accounting scholar in the US, has published numerous
academic articles focusing on the value relevance of fair value accounting
(Barth et al., 1992; Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1995; Barth and Landsman,
1995; Barth et al., 2001; Barth, 2006, 2007). She has argued that, “[u]sing fair
values to measure assets and liabilities is attractive because it meets many
of the Framework’s qualitative characteristics of useful financial statement
information. These criteria are to be applied in the context of the primary
objective of financial reporting, which is to aid investors and other users of
financial statements in making economic decisions.” (Barth, 2006, pg 274).17
Jim Leisenring worked as a board member at the FASB, where he had been
closely involved in the development of key fair value standards such as FAS
133 for derivatives. The derivatives standard had been subject to intense
lobbying by the U.S. Federal Reserve and Leisenring had been closely involved
in the FASB’s successful response to these lobbyists. David Tweedie, chair
of the IASB had previously been Chair of the UK Accounting Standards
board, where he had successfully introduced fair value standards for pensions
(FRS 17). He was a key advocate at the IASB of fair value accounting norms
and his position as chair afforded him additional influence. In 1969 he obtained
a PhD from Edinburgh University School of Management18 and lectured there
from 1973 to 1978 after completing his training as a chartered accountant.
Warren McGregor came from being the Executive Director of the Australian
Accounting Research Foundation which advised the Australian Accounting
Standards Board on technical issues. He was also involved with the IASC from
15These labels emerged during the project on revenue recognition.
16These views were expressed by Interviewee-3, Interviewee-7, Interviewee-9, Interviewee-
10, Interviewee-11.
17See also Barth et al. (2001) for arguments for the value relevance of fair values
measurements.
18This is now called Edinburgh University Business School.
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1983 to 1999 as the technical adviser to the Australian delegation. Patricia
O’Malley had previously served as the Chair of the Canadian Accounting
Standards Board before becoming a board member at IASB.
The existence of this subgroup was to play an important role in exacer-
bating an ideological divide between those supporting fair value and those
opposing it, vis-a-vis the technical content of the Liabilities Project. This
divide was described by a former IASB board member (Interviewee-7), who
observed that in board meetings, three of the fair value group were given
assigned seating together on one side of the boardroom table, creating a
space which was jokingly referred to as “fair value alley”. Some level of
animosity was evident between this ingroup and outgroup, evidence by the
fact that the language used in arguments between these groups has tended
to extend beyond the merely technical. Attempts to introduce standards
with fair value components are often described as “fights” or “battles”. In
a 90-minute interview, Interviewee-7 used the term “fight” ten times when
referring to attempts to issue financial reporting standards requiring the use of
fair values. This is suggestive of the importance of emotional and ideological
differences between the ingroup and the outgroup rather than rational and
purely unemotional differences in preferences for technical schemes of financial
reporting. If so, such group affiliations may have influenced the commitment
of the advocates of fair value to particular technical approaches. So, what
factors led to the existence of a fair value group on the board?
For a start, the initial selection of members for the initial IASB board
prioritised those who were in favour of fair value accounting. Kenneth Spencer
took up the role of Chairman of the Nominating Committee of the IASCF
and, with David Tweedie, selected the first group of IASB board members.
board member Warren McGregor recalls that, they selected the first IASB
board members who were “by and large of like mind and were intent on
reforming financial reporting” . This group had already worked together
and had developed a common understanding about what constituted good
financial reporting. This view is given further corroboration by Zeff (2012),
who argues that “[s]ocialization of the new board was not all that difficult,
because most of the members had already known each other” (pg. 822).
Furthermore, the fair value group shared three main characteristics related
to language, experience of standard setting and prior affiliations. First, they
were native English speakers and came from English-speaking jurisdictions
that tended to favour fair value accounting.19 Not only were they likely to
19However, it is interesting to note that the fair value group comprised only one UK
national, David Tweedie, who as the chairman was less capable of putting forward his
views in board meetings.
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self-categorise as English-speakers, with a shared cultural understanding, but
it also gave these members an advantage over non-native speakers in board
meetings in the early years with the result that they tended to dominate
proceedings, according to Interviewee-9.
Second, some members of the fair value group had been members of the
G4+1, a transnational group which developed during the first few years of
the 1990s before the formation of the IASB. According to Interviewee-12, a
staff member at the IASB during the initial stages of the project,
“. . . it was the people who thought a lot about liabilities on the
old G4+1 network . . . they were the key drivers on this. You know,
they spent a lot of time in the run-up to IAS37, FRS12, you know,
the G4+1 paper on future events and things like that.”
The G4+1 provided a forum for standard setters from a number of anglophone
accounting jurisdictions to share views and develop particular approaches to
accounting issues. Furthermore, the G4+1 provided more than just scope
for intellectual interaction by its members as it also had a social dimension
(see Street, 2005, pg. 98). By offering opportunities for social interactions,
this working group may have encouraged the breaking down of barriers
between representatives of different accounting jurisdictions, and thereby the
development of a pro fair value ingroup. As a result, the old G4+1 group was
not just a working group but a group that shared an intellectual passion for
particular approaches to accounting. A staff member argued,
“I think a number of these board members actually found this
very, very interesting — because it was picking up discussions
they’d had previously, and that was, I think - you know, they just
found it a very intellectually interesting topic.”(Interviewee-12)
This intellectual commitment to particular ways of doing accounting may
explain the advocacy and commitment of the members of the fair value group
to their preferred approach.
Third, the members of the fair value group were all former standard setters
or academics. This may go some way to explaining their commitment to
an ideal of accounting that reflected elements of financial economic theory.
The members of the fair value group were described by staff members as
being “clever” and having “forceful personalities”. When combined with their
previous experience in standard setting and their confidence in the ability
to push through controversial and contested standards, this group came to
influence the overall view of board members by suggesting items for inclusion
on agendas and by arguing forcefully for the superiority of a certain solution to
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a particular problem. The perception within this group, that this progressive
approach was simply the best way to do financial reporting, increased the
confidence of its members that they could (and should) launch the Liabilities
Project primarily to achieve consistency with existing fair value standards,
even if the project was not a response to demands from constituents for new
accounting methods.
So far the discussion has focused on board members. But what of the
technical staff whose task was to write research papers and draft the standards?
This study finds that the fair value ideology extended beyond the board and to
the technical staff at the IASB. When asked how (s)he went about developing
the exposure drafts, a staff member stated,
“I picked a lot of brains on it . . . obviously [Interviewee-11] and
[Technical staff member X] were very helpful. And then I guess
the people I remember that I spoke to most all around us were
Trisha [O’Malley] and Jim [Leisenring]. And, you know, as a
process, I remember I had a lot of very good quality input from
board members, you know, as the draft went through its various
stages.”
In other words, the fair value as a norm of best practice had permeated to
those who carried out the detailed technical work. Furthermore, the board
members were able to guide staff. The same staff member stated that,
“Jim [Leisenring] felt very passionately about it, of course - and
was very supportive of the work that was being done . . . he often
was saying very complimentary things about our work. And, you
know, in that sense, I have, actually, very, very fond memories of
Jim’s support - of him trying to teach me, you know, in my early
days through this project. Actually, just simply because I would
talk to him about it. And he would just come in, you know, into
my office, just to talk about it.”
It is not at all surprising that board members would have been willing to
offer technical guidance to staff working on the Liabilities Project. However,
through such interactions, members of the fair value group were no doubt
able to exert some influence on staff members preparing exposure drafts. As
a result, the papers that appeared in the board meetings no doubt already
reflected some elements of the fair value group’s view, to a greater extent
than if staff had been less directed. It should also be noted that these staff
members, such as Interviewee-12, were often fairly new to the IASB and to
technical accounting discussions, and were thereby potentially more open to
influence by board members.
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An applicant for the position of assistant project manager at the IASB,
Interviewee-13, suggested that one selection criterion for new technical staff
members related to fair value accounting. This interviewee stated that he
had been asked about his attitude to fair value. He believed this to have
been “the most important part of the interview” and after some specific
fair-value related technical questions “they eventually asked ‘so, what’s your
view of fair value’ and that’s the thing they were most interested in.” This
candidate remembers replying that he thought “fair value should be more
widely embraced” and felt that they were satisfied with that response. This
supports the view that the IASB technical staff demonstrated a pro-attitude
to fair value and were likely to be responsive to the fair value group on the
board.
The interviewee also revealed that certain board members were dominant
at board meetings:
“The people who are English native speakers definitely dominated
the conversations. And if you look to nationalities, it was two
Americans who clearly dominated the table . . . Jim Leisenring and
Mary Barth made sure their agenda is reflected in what was done
by the IASB.”
Interviewee-13 described Mary Barth as “the undisputed queen at the table”
because of her technical competence, eloquence and self-confidence. Certain
board members were singled out by interviewees as being dominating board
discussions, especially on technical issues related to fair value. According to
Interviewee-13, Jim Leisenring was extremely persuasive and could be quite
pugnacious in his approach and Mary Barth presented “articulate” arguments,
drawing on her academic experience. The interviewee suggested that these
individual advocates could not successfully have dominated the proceedings
as individuals yet worked effectively as a team to swing opinion on the board.
The same interviewee (Interviewee-13) had also attended board meetings
as an observer in 2003 and noted that language skills played an important role
in determining domination of the board discussions, particularly pronounced
during complex technical discussions.The interviewee noted that non-native
English speakers were at a significant disadvantage during board meetings,
often being “intellectually competent” but “somewhat reserved” with the
result that they made limited contributions to board meetings.
Another factor which drove the ingroup view was a shared technical
background. This was true not just for the board members, but for the
technical staff who prepared staff working papers, exposure drafts, comment
letter analyses and so on. Although less is known about the impact of
staff views on regulatory outcomes, it is clear that the team working on the
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Liabilities Project were broadly in favour of fair value approaches to the
reporting of non-financial liabilities, or at least they were willing to draft
proposals that reflected the dominant fair value view at board meetings. A
technical staff member, Interviewee-11, argued that,
“The first big issue you get into colours your view and your
understanding of what can be achieved and what a good result is
. . . If you are introduced to pensions as the first thing you think
about in accounting, it actually means you are pushed into current
values . . . and you cannot then understand why other areas of
accounting don’t do this.”
Each of the key board advocates of the Liabilities Project had experience in
fair value accounting, as did many of the technical staff associated with the
project.
Thus far, it has been shown that the fair value group on the board
possessed certain characteristics and common objectives that would have
been expected to increase their influence over the standard setting process.
The important question, which I now address, is whether this fair value group
influenced the outcome of the Liabilities Project, and if so, how?
5.2. Group effects, or ‘internal lobbying’
Interview and documentary evidence reveals a picture of ingroup effects
influencing both agenda-setting decisions and the ongoing management of
the project. These were important because they opened up the IASB to
due process criticisms from constituents. Group effects can be observed
and these led to two categories of influence on decision-making. First, the
proposed changes to IAS 37 were perceived to be merely clarificatory by the
ingroup and slipped onto the standard setting agenda without compliance
with normal procedures. Second, once the project was underway, the ingroup
displayed excessive confidence in their ability to complete the project, in
spite of the mounting opposition, and viewed opposing views as surprising
and intellectually weak. As a result of these two effects, they did not take
action in good time to avoid due process complaints and failed to adjust
particularly unpopular elements of their proposed changes to IAS 37 (such
as the requirements regarding pending litigations which were particularly
unpopular with US interest groups).
The project was added to the standard setting agenda in 2003 as part of a
convergence project, but its objectives soon shifted to a focus on new proposals
for recognition and measurement of non-financial liabilities. This shift was not
a response to constituents’ demands, as would have been expected. Instead,
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the impetus originated from the fair value ingroup who argued that the
standard was often misinterpreted by preparers and was inconsistent with
other standards for the reporting of uncertain liabilities (e.g. IAS 39 for
financial instruments). This group was committed to the view that the
inconsistency with other fair value standards was a problem that required
attention, consistent with the existence of a logic of appropriateness (Young,
1996). Furthermore, they were not responding to constituents demands for
change (Pelger, 2015), but acted on their own sense of what constituted
appropriate amendments. Under IASB due process rules at the time, staff
should have producd a research paper, as Figure 2 shows:
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Constituents expected to see a staff research paper, but none was produced.
The board members who had originally initiated the project justified this
omission on the grounds that the project constituted only a minor clarification
of existing rules with the result that it would be acceptable, given the
procedural norms, not to publish a research paper. During the IASB board
meeting to discuss the feedback received, the project team noted that many
constituents appeared to have misunderstood IAS 37 (that is, the original
standard). Faced with this, the members of the fair value group argued that
they viewed the proposed amendments as constituting a mere “clarification of
those ambiguities” (IASB, a). This suggests that the board did not want to
portray the Liabilities Project as the development of a new standard. Instead,
they pitched the project as minor, claiming that the intention was merely
aimed at clarifying the original standard.
The analysis of the audio recording of the January 2007 board meeting,
reveals the new project manager repeatedly questioning whether addressing
measurement issues is beyond the stated objectives of the project. She states
that she does not understand why measurement was being addressed when the
initial remit was simply to look at FAS146 convergence and then recognition
of liabilities. She says, “What I’m saying . . . is that there is no measurement
objective in IAS 37 today and what I’m saying is that it is beyond the scope of
the project to get a measurement objective and put it in IAS 37”. (00:24:48 -
25:00:07) She continues later on the same theme, saying, “I’m still not clear on
what the board would like us to do . . . I’m not clear on where this conversation
has exactly taken us. Has the conversation taken us down the line where we
now have an explicit project objective to determine what the measurement
objective in IAS 37 is?” (00:52:34- 00:52:56) The fair value group responded
by arguing for a ‘building block’ approach that would build on what was
already in the standard, thus addressing measurement as well as recognition
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as part of a process of clarification. In spite of some opposition from non-fair
value group members (such as Gilbert Gerard, 00:56:00 - 00:56:24), the board
did not remove the requirement to address issues of measurement which were
subsequently detailed in the second exposure draft. Such arguments would
be consistent with the existence of a fair value “logic of appropriateness”
(Young, 1994) since the board appeared to see the introduction of fair value
as an improvement to the quality of accounting for non-financial liabilities,
irrespective of the views of others.
The analysis of audio recordings of four board meetings revealed evidence
of the relative influence of the fair value group, especially earlier in the
project’s lifetime. The intention was to find if any differences existed between
the contribution to board discussion of the fair value group and the non- fair
value group. The analysis of the board meetings reveals the dominance of
the fair value group during the first few years of the project, specifically until
2009, both in terms of dominance of the discussion time and assertiveness
of contributions. The analysis of the four meetings (totalling three hours
and fifty-two minutes of technical discussion time, excluding discussion by
staff members and chair) reveals a gradual diminution in the power of the
fair value group between the early stages of the project and 2009. A key
reason identified for this shift in the power of the fair value group is the
change in the constitution of the board, with new board members. such as
Stephen Cooper, who were both native english speakers and forceful in their
contributions to technical debate. Figure 2 below summarises the analysis of
the audio recordings of the board meetings.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
The analysis shows that the fair value group were dominant in terms of
their share of the discussion time during the meetings that took place in July
2006, October 2006 and January 2007 with each member speaking for for
between 2.3 and 5.4 times as long as those members in the non-fair value
group. At this stage of the project, the topics for discussion were broadly
focused on the project objectives, the first exposure draft and responses from
constituents through letters and roundtable events. However, it can be seen
that by the time of the April 2009 meeting, the influence of the group over the
meetings (in terms of dominating discussion time) was declining. This can in
part by attributed to the increasing contributions made by native English
speakers such as Stephen Cooper who joined the board in August 2007. In
the April 2009 board meeting analysed, Cooper spoke for sixteen minutes
whereas Leisenring spoke for less than eight minutes. In contrast, in the earlier
meeting in January 2007, Leisenring spoke for over twenty minutes. Other
Page 20
board members who were not native English speakers, yet had a excellent
language skills and were assertive included Prabhakar Kalavacherla (“PK”)
who joined in January 2009 and spoke for over seven minutes and Wei-Guo
Zhang who joined in July 2007 and spoke for just under seven minutes during
the April 2009 board meeting. Naturally, the analysis of discussion time is a
very blunt tool when attempting to analyse the influence of particular groups.
For one thing, it underemphasises the impact on the discussion of the native
english speakers who tended to speak far more quickly than those for whom
English was relatively new. Those with a poor command of English would
tend to speak slowly — and occasionally incoherently — which would result
in a longer speech time, yet no proportionate increase in their influence over
board decisions.
Domination of discussion time is a useful indicator of overall dominance of
the agenda at board meetings, but other factors are also evidently important,
such as the timing of a contribution to the discussion and the rhetorical
skills and assertiveness of the speaker. In this regard, the fair value group
members had the advantage in the earlier board meetings analysed, speaking
earlier in the discussion and presenting their arguments more forcefully.
Generally board meetings would begin with a staff member (usually the
project manager) making a statement and asking for the board’s decision on
a particular question. This would often be repeated as the staff would need
to ask several questions of the board during the meeting. The first speaker to
respond to the staff member’s question would have the potential to shape the
initial discussion, thereby exerting influence on the flow of the meeting. In
the July 2006 meeting, the staff asked 7 questions and a member of the fair
value group was the first to speak after 4 of these questions (although the
fair value group included only 5 individuals). In the October 2006 meeting,
the discussion was less structured but fair value group members were first to
speak after both staff questions. In the January 2007 meeting, the fair value
group were first to respond to 12 of the 18 questions posed by the project
manager. By April 2009 this pattern was beginning to change, with fair value
group members speaking first after only 5 of the 12 staff questions asked, as
the confident new board members jumped into the discussion early.
Rhetorical skills are hard to define, and their influence on board decision-
making is not easy to identify. However, it is clear from the audio recordings
that fair value group members were generally more assertive than their non
fair value board counterparts in the 2006 and 2007 meetings. It is likely that
this was a source of influence in shaping board discussions. Whereas fair
value group members used repetition and made strong assertions, other board
members would tend to precede statements by phrases such as “I think” or
end statements with phrases such as “ or am I wrong?” which weakened the
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rhetorical effectiveness of their remarks.
As an example, in the January 2007, meeting one non-native speaker
from the non fair value group made a slow and faltering statement, asking
a question that repeated much of what was discussed earlier in the meeting.
The board member said,
”. . . I’m not sure . . . what kind of things . . . especially that we are
limited in what we can do in the measurement objective . . . .?”
(00:23:48 - 00:24:47)
In response, the staff member repeated the answer she had previously given.
Such contributions to the discussion were neither persuasive, nor influential
on the course of the subsequent discussion. In contrast, in the same meeting,
a fair value group member, Jim Leisenring, complained about the reporting
of feedback from round table meetings in strong terms. He said,
“What the hell does ’artificially’ mean? I’m sure it was said. But
what’s artificial about it? I either applied the term or I didn’t
apply the term. There isn’t anything either artificial or real! ”
(January 2007 IASB board meeting, 00:02:59 – 00:03:39)
In contrast to the remarks of the board member, whose English was poor,
this statement was more emphatic, confident and forceful. The repetition
of the term ‘artificial’ three times drives home Leisenring’s frustration with
what he apparently perceived as unhelpful feedback from certain constituents.
It was also not unusual for him to raise his voice for emphasis (for example,
in the January 2007 meeting at 00:33:51 - 00:34:13).
In addition to these prosodic features of the speech of members of the fair
value group, other non-lexical factors, such as physical gestures, contributed
to the power of the contributions made to board meetings. In the July
2006 meeting, Jim Leisenring became so animated in his complaints about
constituents at round table meetings that the chair had to ask him to stop
waving his hands about as he risked hitting the board member sitting next to
him (00:31:40 - 00:32:45). In addition, Leisenring would often hit the table to
emphasise a point, for example in the July 2006 meeting (00:09:50-00:10:40)
and again in the October 2006 meeting (00:20:30 - 00:20:43).
Leisenring also used humour on occasion. In the July 2006 board meeting,
he complained about a particular Big Four accounting firm attending multiple
feedback meetings. He said,
“If [X] show up in all three locations to say the same thing [nervous
laughter from group] . . . I mean it’s bad enough that we have to
listen to it once! [laughter from group]” (00:31:40 - 00:31:49)
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Having introduced the argument using humour, Leisenring then went on
to develop this point more seriously in the next few minutes of the board
meeting.
Other members of the fair value group, such as Mary Barth and Tricia
O’Malley, were often supportive of Leisenring’s view, although they tended
to be less assertive. Furthermore, Warren McGregor and Jim Leisenring
disagreed strongly on certain technical details on occasion, but both strongly
advocated the proposed revisions to IAS 37. Leisenring and Barth were
capable of being assertive when disagreeing with the views presented by
other board members. The non fair-value group member, Gilbert Gelard
suggested that any move away from neutral reporting of constituent views
or removing comments which did not appear to make sense to some board
members would be “a way to apply censorship.” 20 but he was immediately
countered by Jim Leisenring who repeated his view that staff ought to have
challenged constituents during the round table sessions to arrive at a “common
understanding” of the meaning of their comments.
It has been shown that the fair value group dominated board discussions
in the early stages of the project. However, it was not just group effects
and the strength of particular individuals that contributed to their influence.
Infrastructural features of the IASB, such as project management structures,
increased the influence of the fair value group. Interview evidence reveals
that, until 2007, the project was allocated a small group of board members
as ‘advisers’, and that this advisory group was composed of members of the
fair value group who were advocates for the proposed revisions to IAS 37
(Interviewee-10). Although the project was discussed relatively frequently at
board meetings, the discussion was sometimes relatively brief and periods of
up to two months often separated board meetings.21 As a result, the project
team were likely to be less aware of potential dissenting views of other board
members at the initial stages of drafting. The fact that the project advisory
group was not representative of the views of the board members may have
resulted in some bias towards the views of the ingroup being reflected in the
initial exposure draft.
In 2005, a regular review by the Trustees had called into question decision-
making and governance procedures at the IASB, in particular, board compo-
sition, voting mechanisms and due process. Yet, the project still proceeded
without a research paper. The categorisation of the project as ‘minor’ meant
that the team were not required by IASB procedures to commission an initial
staff research paper. According to a member of the IASB technical staff,
20January 2007 IASB board meeting, 00:05:14 – 00:05:40.
21The dates of the board meetings are included as an appendix.
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the ingroup supervisers of the Liabilities Project believed they were simply
clarifying existing requirements whereas everyone else thought they were
changing them.
“the board members genuinely thought it was a clarification.
Because, they read the standard one way and they thought, ‘if
other people are reading it differently we ought to clarify it’ ”.
(Interviewee-10)
Yet, the fair value ingroup were apparently out of step with the constituents
and ultimately, the other board members, who came to see the project as
proposing major amendments to existing reporting requirements.
In the initial stages of the project, the fair value group believed that the
project would be completed within a reasonable timeframe, and certainly
while these individuals were still in post. Interview evidence suggests that
the fair value ingroup believed the revisions to IAS 37 to be “obviously the
‘right’ thing to do” and that they would be able to persuade everyone else
that this was the case (Interviewee-10). In an interview, a member of the
IASB technical staff highlighted the confidence of the ingroup, and stating
that initially, “there was an expectation that the project would be completed
quite easily and without too much opposition because the board members at
the time thought it was such an obviously right thing to do”(Interviewee-10).
The fact that the project was becoming increasingly unlikely to result in
the publication of a revised standard did not appear to weaken the group’s
continued advocacy. This is consistent with the view that highly cohesive
groups, in which members share a strong social identity, are more likely than
individuals to continue their support of a project, that is unlikely to succeed,
in spite of evidence to suggest this is not rational (Haslam et al., 2006).
The fair value sub-group suggested responding to the negative responses
from constituents through a “communication strategy to help constituents
understand this project”. Technical staff at the IASB were amazed that
constituents did not seem able to understand what the IASB believed to be a
straightforward technical approach. A member of the IASB technical staff
revealed his view that,
“With non-financial liabilities, people are really struggling with
the concept of uncertain amounts . . . I’m not sure why there is so
much confusion. Maybe people don’t know what expected values
are, which is a bit of a worry.” (Interviewee-9)
In saying this, the staff member states his/her view that the project had
somehow been misunderstood by constituents, or that constituents were not
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capable of understanding some of the technical concepts contained within the
exposure draft. This attitude suggests an exaggerated sense of confidence in
the proposed approach as well as a disregard for conflicting views, which are
consistent with the influence of the ingroup and potentially symptomatic of
groupthink.
The sense of incomprehension at the opposition faced by the project was
expressed in an interview with an IASB technical staff member, who argued
that,
“I guess there was still a frustration among some staff, including
me and some board members, that this project that was so obvi-
ously doing the right thing was taking so long and meeting such
opposition. And we thought ‘why’? ‘Why can’t people see that
this is the right thing to do?”’ (Interviewee-11)
In the face of negative responses to the first exposure draft, the same IASB
staff member remembers thinking,
“Oh for heaven’s sake, what more do we need to do to convince
you?!”
Interviewee-11 went on to suggest that the IASB “just completely under-
estimated people’s opposition” to the project.” The staff working on the
project did not anticipate the negative responses they would receive after
the first exposure draft in 2005. According to this staff member, even when
they did receive significant criticism, they still believed that “there was some
way of continuing to push this through.” This reveals that members of the
ingroup were confident both of the ‘rightness’ of the project in technical terms
and their ability to overcome opposition. The project proposals were not
radically altered at this stage and the project work continued in spite of the
negative feedback received from constituents, in comment letters, weblogs
and meetings.
In a board meeting that took place in January 2007, the manager of the
project presented a report of feedback from roundtable events to discuss the
Liabilities Project revisions to IAS 37. Jim Leisenring expressed his irrita-
tion at the staff’s ‘neutral’ and unannotated reporting of certain comments
made by constituents. During the meeting, he demonstrated his frustration
by describing certain constituents’ statements pejoratively and questioning
the purpose of recording such “obnoxious” views, referring to the case of
pending litigation liabilities where he attributed to constituents the “huge
misconception that I’ve heard in all the [round table] discussions that the
figure included should be a figure that will actually be paid out.” (01:20:04 -
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01:20:42). This reflects the view of fair value group members that constituents’
often held irrational opinions on technical accounting issues. The confidence
of the ingroup that this demonstrates and this assumption that those who
disagree must have been wrong, is consistent with the symptoms of groupthink
proposed by Janis (1972).
By the time of the publication of the second exposure draft in January
2010, outgroup board members began to become increasingly uncomfortable
with project. Following complaints from constituents that the full draft of the
new standard had not been made available soon enough after the publication
of the exposure draft, the board considered extending the comment period.
An extension would delay the vote on the new standard until after June 30th,
at which date the three board members who had supported the project were
due to retire. Jim Leisenring argued against delaying the vote on the grounds
that he did not believe that constituents misunderstood the proposals due
to insufficient outreach or delays to the publication of the draft standard.
If Leisenring’s argument had been accepted and had the comment period
not been extended, the vote on the revised standard would have taken place
before his retirement on 30th June.
I have argued that that the fair value group were instrumental in the
original inclusion of the Liabilities Project on the standard setting agenda
and to its continued development in the face of severe opposition. However,
from 2008 the situation was very different for a number of reasons.
The first of these was the financial crisis, which exacerbated the difficul-
ties faced by the project team. Since the upheavals of the financial crisis,
constituents had been arguing that the proposed recognition rules would
increase the level of liabilities for preparers, at a time when volatility in asset
and liability values was perceived to be a concern (IASB, 2008)22. Concerns
about due process were also heightened at this time, particularly for projects
perceived to incorporate elements of fair value. The fact that particular
approaches to accounting were increasingly referred to by the label ‘fair value’
meant that the such accounting came in for criticism once fair value had been
suggested as a pro-cyclical factor that exacerbated the financial crisis. Had the
fair value group been promoting a less clearly labelled approach — a family
of modern accounting techniques — the Liabilities Project might not have
been tainted by its association with fair value accounting. The fact that “fair
value” has been stigmatized by many in the accounting community post-crisis
and as such the fair value group may have found it particularly hard to push
through the Liabilities Project after 2008. There is some discussion during
22http://www.ifrs.org/Meetings/MeetingDocs/IASB/Archive/Liabilities/Development%20of%202nd%20ED/IAS37-
0802b06b.pdf
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the board meetings about whether or not the appropriate measurement for
a non-financial liability proposed under the revisions to IAS 37 should be
considered exit price fair value or not, and if so, whether or not it would be
disingenuous to fail to label it as such.
The second reason related to board composition. As the members of the fair
value group reached the end of their terms on the board, the ingroup became
increasingly weak, particularly with the retirements of Mary Barth in 2009
and the impending retirement of Jim Leisenring in June 2010. Interviewees
suggested that the declining board support for the project was associated
with the increasing realisation among less ardent supporters of the Liabilities
Project that the project that it was unlikely to succeed, partly because of
its unpopularity but also because of imminent changes in board composition
that would remove key advocates. A long-serving and influential IASB board
member, interviewed in January 2011 described the waning interest in the
Project as follows,
“There were some guys here who wanted to push it. Some of us
thought, ‘this isn’t the right time, but you’re going to run out of
time unless you do it now, so this is your last chance. Let’s see
what happens.’” (board member, Interviewee-7).
With limited time before the key proponents of the project were due to step
down in June 2010, several other board members judged the project not worth
supporting. The project history did indeed display some tell-tale signs of
rushed preparation such as the decision to re-expose only part of the proposed
standard in the second exposure draft. This would be consistent with a desire
by the fair value ingroup to rush the standard through in order to minimise
the chances of a defeat as a result of imminent changes in board composition.
Figure 3 shows those Board members who retired between 2006 and 2010.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
It can be seen that the key advocates of the project (and members of the fair
value group) retired in the three years before the project was removed from the
agenda. Scholars of social psychology, such as Bartel and Wiesenfeld (2013),
have argued that prototype ambiguity develops if an ingroup is no longer
able to define itself as a coherent entity. The changing board composition did
indeed remove clear self-definition for the fair value group at the IASB. In
particular, the departure of Jim Leisenring, who served as a natural prototype
of the ingroup, may well have led to a shift in the prototypicality and shared
social identity of the group and thus to a weakening of support for the project.
Page 27
By the time the second exposure draft came to a vote in spring 2010,
the board was divided in its support. Figure 5 summarises key data about
the board members at the time of the vote, in particular how they voted,
whether they belonged to the fair value group, what they objected to in the
exposure draft (if they voted against the project), what their backgrounds
were, whether they had former affiliations to G4+1, IASC or FASB, and when
they retired.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
The three board retirements in June 2010 were of members who had voted
in favour of the second exposure draft (Leisenring, Garnett and Gelard). Their
retirement effectively removed the definite majority as the new members’
voting behviours were not known. This offered opponents of the project an
opportunity to undermine it by delaying the vote until after June 2010, by
which time three of the pro-votes would be replaced.23 More importantly,
the retirement of Jim Leisenring, a key advocate of the project, was likely to
have a significant effect on the overall commitment of the remaining board
members to supporting the project. According to Interviewee-10, these board
changes were significant for the Liabilities Project because the board members
standing down were “pioneering thinkers who were obviously not going to be
replaced with pioneering thinkers” (Interviewee-10). The retirement from the
board of members of the fair value ingroup was important not only because
of the loss of the votes, but also because of the loss of project advocacy by
these strong characters. Although only one of the board members who retired
in June 2010 was a member of this ingroup (Leisenring), earlier retirements
(O’Malley in 2007 and Barth in 2009) were important as they eliminated key
advocates of the project.
5.3. External lobbying
The Liabilities Project offers an example of successful lobbying by IASB
constituents to have a proposed new standard setting project removed from
the IASB agenda. One important reason why their opposition was effective
relates to due process issues. The actions of the ingroup, attributable to
group effects, generated due process vulnerabilities for the project which
23The three retirees were replaced by two new members, Elke Koenig and Paul Pacter
who could not be relied on to vote in favour. Pacter was a career standard-setter having
served at the FASB and having been heavily involved with IAS 39 which drew heavily on
the US standard, FAS 133. This increased the chances that he would support a fair value
project. However, Koenig’s experience was in the financial services industry in Germany,
and she was therefore a less reliable pro-vote.
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lobbyists were able to exploit. By contrast, lobbying against earlier projects
to introduce elements of fair value had not been successful, for example
financial instruments and pension projects such as IAS 39 and IAS 19.
The first Exposure Draft published in 2005 attracted 123 comment letters
which were mostly negative and addressed both technical and due process
issues. Technical concerns focused on the reliability of the proposed mea-
surement approach and the need for the production of a revised standard.
Constituents argued that any divergences in practice could be eliminated
without the need to re-issue IAS 37 or dispense with the “most likely out-
come” approach to measurement.24 Overall, constituents doubted the need
for a revised standard.25 The IASB had to admit that, “[m]ost respondents
disagree with the proposals and state that the board has not made a suf-
ficiently compelling case for the changes arising from its consideration of
contingencies.”(IASB, a, ¶6).
The second exposure draft, published in 2010 attracted 211 comment
letters, of which 114 were from preparers and 27 from professional accounting
bodies. Technical criticisms included the use of expected values for single
events which was seen to be unreliable and the problem of revealing privileged
information for a pending lawsuit (the latter raised by the 88 preparers from
a range of industry sectors). Other criticisms included the inclusion of profit
and risk margins in the measurement of the liability and the logical flaw in
‘copying’ the valuation of liabilities from that used for valuing liabilities in a
business combination. Constituents additionally criticised the inconsistency
between the definition of ‘liability’ in the exposure draft and that in the IASB
conceptual framework.
The project team acknowledged that, “a substantial number of other
respondents do not support the continuation of the project in its current
form” (¶2.1.2, Comment Letter Analysis, 2010). It should be noted that this
statement underplays the negative emphasis of many of the comment letters.
A small number of organisations were key to the publication and European
adoption of the standard. These were the European Financial Reporting
Advisory Group (EFRAG) and the FASB. Obtaining the approval of EFRAG
was key to having the standard published as EFRAG advises the European
Commission on endorsement of standards. The approval of EFRAG is thus
extremely important for the IASB as, without EU endorsement, a reporting
standard does not form part of EUIFRS and cannot apply to EU listed
24An additional concern was that non-endorsement by the EU would place a burden on
European companies with US listings.
25The fact that there had been only two referrals to the IFRS Interpretations Committee
since the project was launched is consistent with this view.
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companies (see also Zeff, 2002, pg. 45).26 The views expressed on the project
by EFRAG were generally negative. At a meeting on Wednesday March 17th
2010 between the IASB and representatives of EFRAG on convergence-related
issues, the unofficial observer minutes state:
“The EFRAG representatives expressed their grave concerns about
the IAS 37 proposals. The EFRAG noted that there is lots of
uncertainty about the probability-of-outflow recognition criterion
and urged the IASB to expose the whole Standard for a new
comment period.”
The EFRAG comment letter in response to the second exposure draft states:
“[I]n our view, the proposals set out in the exposure draft fail to
satisfy the IASB’s objective to improve the quality of financial
reporting.” (Comment Letter from EFRAG (CL184) 19th May
2010)
Such a negative response to the exposure draft could only signal the likelihood
that the EU would refuse to endorse the standard if it were to be voted in by
the IASB board. This in turn would no doubt impact on voting behaviour of
the board; little point would exist in pushing through a standard if it was
unlikely to be endorsed by the EU.27 Speaking of a “sticky” meeting with
EFRAG, a staff member at the IASB argued that,
“to some degree, this was just a project to beat the IASB up over.
Because, you know, there was a lot of concern about, you know,
the standard setting here was running away a little bit . . . it was
the whole argument that, ‘there’s too much fair value’, you know,
and ‘this is radically changing accounting’. It got caught up in
that debate at that particular time. And so, to some degree, I
think it just got caught up by just a general concern that the IASB
was sort of just getting too radical too quickly.”(Interviewee-12)
The second exposure draft was particularly unpopular with US constituencies,
particularly the American Bar Association (ABA). During a time of attempted
rapprochement with FASB, the requirement to recognise pending litigations,
and measure them at expected value, was claimed to be an obstacle to US
GAAP–IFRS convergence by the ABA . Given the importance attached to
26This is subject to the requirements of IAS Regulation (no.1606/2002).
27Moreover, the perceived risk that the standard might fail to be endorsed may have
increased as a result of the decision by the EU not to endorse the new standard on financial
instruments, IFRS 9 in November 2009.
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convergence by the IASB at this time, the decision to continue to push for
rules relating to pending litigations may be seen as an example of group
effects, specifically over-commitment to the project and over-confidence in
the group’s ability to succeed in publishing the revised standard without
making significant concessions to ABA. One staff interviewee admitted that
it was perhaps over-confident of the IASB not to water down the proposals
to exclude pending litigation in order to mitigate opposition from the ABA
(Interviewee-10).
5.3.1 Technical concerns
Many constituents argued that the existing standard worked well and that
the proposed changes were “unnecessary and a mistake” (Interviewee-5). This
interviewee stated that many constituents with whom he had discussed were
of the opinion that,
“[I]t ain’t broke, so why fix it? People are quite happy with
measuring liabilities, of the kind we’re talking about here on the
basis of ’do you expect to pay something?”
In other words, the project proposals were not seen as a sensible idea by
constituents.
Many comment letters criticised the extension of expected values to single
events. In particular, they objected to the fact that an ‘apparently precise’
probability for a single event may be misleading. For example Tata Steel
Group UK, a UK preparer, argued that,
“We believe that a liability measure based on the probability
weightings of all possible outcomes is not the most rational mea-
sure, as the entity would calculate an amount that it would be
unlikely to pay and this would not provide decision useful infor-
mation” (Comment letter CL17).
The Singapore Accounting Standards Council, argued in its comment letter
that,
“. . . for single obligations, the use of an expected value approach
is likely to result in measurement at an amount that bears little
resemblance to the actual outflows, which the board recognises. It
would lead to the inclusion in financial statements of amounts that,
arguably, will be of very limited informational value” (Comment
letter CL37).
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This argument refers to the deficiencies of probabilistic valuations in cases
where limited evidence exists and also highlights the belief in many con-
stituents that the aim of providing useful information would simply not be
met by the proposed measurement rules. In response, an IASB board member
defended the proposal by arguing,
“Although there are difficulties measuring such obligations, it is
better to put a number in the accounts which is greater than zero,
than to throw your hands up in the air and fail to assign any
value” (Interviewee-2).
However, the Accounting Standards Board, the UK standard setter was not
satisfied with the approach taken in the proposed standard and argued that,
“The ASB believes that the measurement proposals, similar to
the recognition proposals, will not be well received. In the absence
of support for both . . . and taking into consideration the IASB’s
divided views as is evident with 6 IASB members offering an
alternative view) the ASB is of the opinion that the IASB should
defer the project until post 2011 when it should have more time
available to undertake a fundamental rethink of its proposals.”
(CL12, Accounting Standards Board).
This comment shows that external constituencies were aware of the increas-
ingly weak support for the project within the IASB. This vulnerability would
be open to exploitation by particular interest groups who were intent on
blocking the project. Furthermore, constituents argued that the project
represented an attempt to measure current exit price which they described as
“fair value by stealth.” (¶3.1.2, IASB Comment Letter Analysis, 2010)
Some respondents accused the board of proposing recognition criteria
which were inconsistent with the conceptual framework. They argued that
the removal of the probability of outflows test for the recognition of liabilities
appeared to be inconsistent with the definition of a liability in the conceptual
framework (IASC, 1989) which is predicated on the existence of an outflow
of economic benefits. This inconsistency was particularly striking given that
the voting academic board member had expressed a clear view that the aim
of the IASB is to “to apply its conceptual framework, which is specified in
its Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements”
(Barth, 2007). Board members were aware of the potential problem of making
proposals that were inconsistent with the existing conceptual framework,
discussing this issue in board meetings (for example in the meeting that took
place in January 2007). The inconsistency with the framework offered an
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opportunity to opponents of the project to criticise the IASB, even though
existing, published standards, such as IAS 39 for financial instruments were
also at odds with the probability of outflows element of the definition of a
liability in the conceptual framework (Interviewee-10).
5.3.2 Procedural concerns
In addition to opposition on technical grounds, respondents raised due process
concerns about the IASB’s due process. In the comment letter summary
produced for the board Meeting in February 2006, the staff noted complaints
from constituents about four particular issues. First, no Discussion Paper had
been produced with the result that there had been insufficient analysis and
discussion of the proposed changes. Second, the comment period had been
only 120 days, which was argued to be too short and which coincided with
the holiday season and the semi-annual external reporting cycle. Third, the
absence of field testing and/or roundtable discussions meant that implemen-
tation issues were not addressed. Finally, constituents criticised the absence
of a cost-benefit analysis for the proposed changes.
Constituents were aware of the contradictions between the proposed
recognition criteria contained in the exposure drafts and the conceptual
framework at the time. As one interviewee from a professional accounting
body stated,
“they [the IASB] have a right to go ahead even if the whole
world disagrees with them. But there does seem to be some-
thing odd about doing that . . . particularly as it’s not as if what
they’re doing is in accordance with some kind of conceptual
framework. If anything it’s overturning the existing conceptual
framework.”(Interviewee-5)
This demonstrates the irritation felt by some constituents at the perceived
lack of accountability and responsiveness of the IASB to its constituents.
In the face of criticisms that the “stand ready obligation” was inconsistent
with the conceptual framework as existence was not dependent on probable
cash outflows, the board maintained an enigmatic position, in stating that
its analysis, “. . . takes a broader view of rights and obligations together with
inflows and outflows of economic resources than the current Framework”(IASB,
b, ¶11). the board also stated that its standard setting initiatives, were “not
dependent on completing the conceptual framework project” (IASB, 2006,
¶A15). The first of a number of project managers of the Liabilities Project
responded by arguing that an unconditional “stand ready obligation” is
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consistent with the framework, whereas applying the proposals to a conditional
obligation is not (Rees, 2006, pg.30).
In an IASB board meeting in June 2006, the staff argued that the incon-
sistency would be resolved if,
“. . . no specific level of expectation is required for something to
satisfy the definition of a liability. . . . the focus in determining
whether there is a liability has to be on determining whether
there is a present obligation, not considering the probability of an
outflow of resources” (Board meeting June 2006 ¶10).
On one hand, the IASB justified the revisions to IAS 37 as a means of
promoting consistency in the recognition and measurement of liabilities, thus
invoking some kind of conceptual purity (Young, 2014) , yet on the other hand
they were charged by constituents of contradicting the conceptual framework.
The second type of procedural concerns raised related to ‘due process’
issues, in particular to the absence of staff research papers and the charge that
constituents were given insufficient time to comment on the new proposals.
The decision to add the project to the standard setting agenda did not result
from demands for change from external constituents. Instead, the project
morphed from a minor adjustment to IAS 37 as part of the convergence
project with FAS 142, to being what was perceived by constituents as a major
revision of the rules for recognition and measurement.
In fact, the IASB became acutely aware of procedural weaknesses, such as
the lack of constituent demand for the project and the lack of a staff research
paper before its addition to the agenda. In order to avoid encountering similar
problems with future projects, the IASB reworked its procedures for agenda
setting. Notably, from 2011 onwards, more extensive research was required
before a project could be included on the standard setting agenda. As part of
theis research, external constituents were consulted to seek their approval for
the initiation of a project. Figure 6 shows the revised procedures for agenda
seting.28
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
Another due process issue raised by constituents was the limited re-
exposure of proposals. The Comment Letter Analysis prepared by the project
team confirms this view as constituents are reported to have argued that,
28These changes were reflected in the IFRS Foundation Constitution and Due
Process Handbook in 2013, which requires that the project agenda decision
should occur “after, rather than before, the research process has occurred. . . ”
(http://www.iasplus.com/en/resources/ifrsf/due-process/iasb-due-process).
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“. . . due process appears to have been condensed because of a desire to complete
the project before the 2011 deadline and/or before board members come to the
ends of their terms” and that, “a limited-scope exposure draft is a departure
from the board’s normal due process procedures and risks damaging the
board’s reputation” (Comment Letter Analysis, 2010, ¶5.1.2).
Professional accounting organisations also opposed the project. The
ICAEW comment letter included strong complaints about process, in par-
ticular “the limited scope of the issues on which comments are invited”.
Furthermore, they argue that the IASB failed to address fully constituents’
concerns to “highly controversial” proposals and asks why the IASB failed to
“explain publicly why it has rejected commentators’ views”(ICAEW comment
letter, 19th May 2010). Even investor groups raised due process concerns.
In their comment letter to the IASB, the analysts association, CFA (UK)
note that the proposed amendments to the recognition criteria were not
sufficiently re-exposed and they point to a lack of clarity in some elements
of the recognition criteria and describe the aim of the standard as being, “a
bit confusing” (Comment letter CL207).29 These kind of comments and the
language used may be interpreted as particularly negative given that they
are made by a group which generally supports a move towards economic
valuation and with whom the fair value ingroup would likely have felt the
greatest ideological affinity.
The frustration felt by professional accounting organisations that the
IASB ignored technical advice may have contributed to a desire to use any
means necessary to halt the project. In this vein, the scepticism felt by many
constituents about the effectiveness of providing technical comments to the
IASB became clear during interviews. Interviewee-3, a technical partner of
an international accounting firm, expressed his disatisfaction with the IASB’s
lack of responsiveness to constituents’ technical criticisms. In this regard, he
argued that:
“This is one of those topics on which the IASB has become utterly
pig-headed and has stopped listening to their faithful and loyal
constituents” (Interviewee-3).
It is important to note that the term “pig-headed” used here refers to the
interviewee’s view that the IASB were acting cynically by using due process
and outreach to constituents as a means creating legitimacy, even though they
would often fail to amend technical components in response to constituent
feedback. Interviewee-3 explained that opponents of the project aimed to use
29The preference of the CFA for fair value has also been described by Chakravarthy
(2014).
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due process objections to delay the project until its two main supporters were
due to stand down from the IASB board in June 2010:
“This was tactics. Within the IASB there were six dissenting
opinions – and there were going to be two major changes to
the board [at the end of June] . . . So we thought if we could get
it deferred till after June we might get another dissenting vote
and get it defeated [. . . ] By claiming due process in essence we
are going above their heads to the trustees and the supervisory
body . . . It was the most effective way of putting pressure on
them. Because if we simply said to them, ‘we disagree with your
technical arguments’ they would (and regularly did) say (as they
often do) in their basis for conclusions: ‘Some people said this. We
considered it. We disagree we are staying with that argument.’ So
if you try to argue technically, they are quite entitled to disagree.”
Thus, certain interest groups realised that the most effective, and perhaps
only, means of halting the progress of the project was by making complaints
about due process, rather than emphasising the technical concerns that they
believed to be important.
It is for this reason that group effects are so important in explaining
the outcome of the Liabilities Project. Group effects, in particular the
overconfidence of the fair value group and their view of the project as a mere
clarification, contributed to due process vulnerabilities. External lobbying
would have been far less powerful for this project, if internal lobbying had
not led to a failure to follow procedure.
A member of the project team acknowledged that due process concerns
were probably raised primarily as a means of blocking the project. In an
interview, the staff member said,
“They spotted a weakness in due process – some people gen-
uinely thinking there was a problem with the due process – and
ultimately there was, in that this standard which had had no
discussion paper because it was supposed to be minor was making
quite fundamental changes. But if people strongly dislike the
answer, they will use any means to stop it happening. And that’s
when they start arguing due process and conceptual framework.”
(Interviewee-10)
In effect, the Liabilities Project became an accounting cause-ce´le`bre as a
prominent focal point for tensions between constituents and the fair value
group on the board. These tensions arose not only from differences of opinion
Page 36
on technical issues but also from psychological factors such as the deep
resentment felt by certain constituents who believed that their comments on
technical issues went unheeded by an unlistening, unaccountable IASB. These
technical and psychological battles were subsequently played out in the field
of due process, the result being: Non-fair value group 1, Fair value group, 0.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Irrespective of the technical virtues of proposed changes to accounting rules,
standard setters must carefully balance the requirements of due process and
the demands of lobbyists if they are to be effective in publishing revised
standards. The influence of a group of fair value advocates on the IASB board
and on the technical staff on the processes followed in the Liabilities Project is
the focus of this paper. Associated with the existence of this fair value group,
effects observed included the over-confidence of the group in their ability to
publish a revised standard as well as the polarisation of ingroup and outgroup
views. Furthermore, the group dominated board discussions, especially in the
early years of the IASB, in part, because of the fact that they were native
English speakers with previous experience of standard setting.
The identification by Hirschleifer and Teoh (2009) of the important role
of psychological biases in explaining the form of accounting rules is apposite
given the evidence presented in this paper. Yet it appears to have been group
biases rather than individual biases that played a role in influencing the
project studied here. This paper contributes to the literature on standard
setting by highlighting both the interactions between the fair value group
and other board members at the IASB (which I label ‘internal lobbying’)
and also effectiveness of external lobbying for this particular project resulting
from the actions of the fair value group. It reveals that a fair value group,
containing board members as well as techical staff, was responsible for pushing
the project onto the standard setting agenda and managing it in a way that
was perceived by many as being inconsistent with accepted due process
requirements. Studying the existence of this group, and the effects it exerted
on the standard setting process improves our understanding of the key factors
influencing decisions made by the IASB. Furthermore, it highlights the tactical
nature of lobbying by constituents.
Rather than treating the IASB as a single unit of analysis, or a black
box, this study reveals the social processes within the standard setting
organisation which play a role in shaping regulatory outcomes. Much of the
existing literature on standard setting relies heavily on documentary evidence,
such as comment letters to standard setting organisations (Giner and Arce,
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2012) or an analysis of internal documents and board meetings (Baudot,
2014). Although these individual approaches offer many useful insights into
the standard setting discourse, their reliance on documentary evidence may
result in a failure to uncover the real motivations of participants in the process
of standard setting and lobbying.
A notable feature of this work is the interview access to board members
and technical staff who worked on the project team. This enriches the
accounts that emerge from documentary and aural sources by showing that
group-effects led to decisions which opened up the project team to due
process criticisms. Interview evidence reveals that lobbyists chose to raise
due process complaints as the most effective means of slowing the progress of
the Liabilities Project because they realised that technical criticisms would
be ignored. Their use of tactical objections would not have been obvious
through a review of documentation alone. The analysis of four board meetings
reveals the domination of the board’s discussion by the fair value group which
can be attributed to its members’ English language and rhetorical skills,
their technical experience in standard setting and their former affiliations via
organisations such as G4+1.
Admittedly, the role of group effects as a driver of the ideological com-
mitments at the IASB should not be overplayed. The fair value group was
composed of individuals who already held strong pro-fair value views before
they joined the IASB, so it is not justifiable to argue that their views devel-
oped as a result of being part of a group at the IASB. However, the evidence
from interviews points to the fact that group effects magnified the individual
members’ commitment to particular accounting approaches and provided a
sense of heightened confidence in their ability to push through the Liabilities
Project, in spite of the lack of support for it by constituents.
I have argued that the fair value group at the IASB appeared excessively
confident in its ability to deliver a revised non-financial liabilities standard.
While its members viewed their proposals as the best way to do financial
reporting, many constituents argued that the project exceeded its initial
remit. Interview evidence has revealed that the fair value group believed
the Liabilities Project to be a minor project that was intended to clarify
existing guidance. Yet, it soon became evident through constituent feedback
and IASB board discussions that it was widely regarded as a major revision,
which others regarded as being ideologically driven and impractical. No
staff research paper was produced and board level advocates of the project
argued that they were merely clarifying what was already in the existing
standard. The fact that the project team and board level advisors acted as
if the proposed changes did not constitute a major revision, contrary to the
view of most of the constituents, suggests the presence of group effects. The
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fair value group were either unaware of the likely criticisms of the project
or simply did not take them seriously due to an exaggerated sense of their
ability to complete the project and gain necessary approval from constituents.
Group effects can be observed from agenda-setting, through to due process
issues and a reluctance by project advocates to recognise that the project
was not likely to result in a published standard in its current form. The
Liabilities Project was added to the standard setting agenda in spite of a
lack of constituent demand and without the publication of a staff paper.
Similarly, the decision to limit the re-exposure of the proposals on recognition,
in spite of the post financial crisis focus on due process, is indicative of the
overconfidence of the fair value group, resulting from group effects. This
decision led constituents to demand an extension to the comment period, as
a result of which, the vote on the new standard would have to be delayed
until after the retirement of its key advocates. A further expression of a
group effect at the IASB can be seen in the sense of surprise on the part
of both board advocates and technical staff at the hostile response of many
constituents to the project proposals.
Of particular interest in the case of the Liabilities Project is the way in
which this internal lobbying within the IASB made the project more vulnerable
to certain types of external lobbying activity. Both the failure to publish
an initial staff research paper and the failure to re-expose fully contentious
technical issues is consistent with an ingroup effect, as well as showing
tendencies towards the kind of sub-optimal decision-making associated with
‘group think’ (Janis, 1972). The IASB did not act as one unit, but instead
the fair value ingroup drove the project. Unlike technical criticisms, which
the board could acknowledge but decide not to act on, due process criticisms
effectively leap-frogged the board and involved the trustees at the IFRS
Foundation to whom the board was answerable.
The project was further damaged by its omission from the agenda of the
convergence project with FASB. Furthermore, in the wake of the financial crisis,
projects that did not address crisis-related issues, particularly those perceived
to be advancing fair value accounting, were not prioritised. Ultimately the
project became dependent on the continued support of this fair value group
of board members. However, all but one of them was due to retire from the
board by the end of June 2010.
Interview and documentary evidence suggests that the over-confidence of
the group may have resulted from the fact that the members of the ingroup
all had prior experience of publishing fair value standards, often in spite
of tough opposition. For example, at the FASB, Jim Leisenring had been
heavily involved in the project to publish FAS 133 in spite of opposition from
Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve. At the same time, their willingness
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to treat the proposed amendments as minor signals that they were out of
touch with opinions of their constituents, and, more importantly, with those
of fellow board members. Similarly, technical staff working as project leaders
had experienced fair value standards before, most being British and familiar
with the introduction of fair value pension accounting in the UK.
We have seen that group-related features of the IASB appear to have
led to the initiation of the project and the continued advocacy by the fair
value group of a project containing unpopular technical proposals regarding
both recognition and measurement. Yet, structural characteristics were
also striking in their effect on the project, and on their facilitation of these
apparent ingroup behaviours. The project staff tended to have a small group
of board advisers on each project. On the Liabilities Project, the board
advisers initially selected were all strong fair value advocates who supported
the project. None of the interviewees was able to recollect the reason for
the assignment but most suggested it was probably a random allocation.
Whatever the reason for the particular composition of this advisory group, it
may have prevented the project team from obtaining early feedback about
possible dissent from other board members, particularly on agenda-setting
issues. The IASB introduced changes to the agenda-setting process in 2011
which made explicit the requirement to issue a staff paper and to garner
support from IASB constituents before including a project on the agenda.
The support of the fair value group was crucial for the survival of the
Liabilities Project , especially after the second exposure draft, when it was
subject to intense criticism. Several interviewees argued that with Jim
Leisenring’s retirement from the board in 2010, the project had lost one of its
key advocates and, as a result, it was extremely unlikely to have been voted
through. Thus, the disintegration of the fair value group was linked to the
removal of the project from the standard setting agenda.30
The case of the Liabilities Project also highlights the use of tactical
criticisms by constituents. Recent work has argued that, while lobbying
of standard setters may be based on self-interest, the arguments made in
comment letters tend to focus on conceptual arguments rather than on the
economic consequences of a particular requirement (Giner and Arce, 2012,
pg.674). The use of tactical procedural criticisms to block the Liabilities
Project appears to have had more to do with a general opposition to the
IASB’s emphasis on current value accounting than any specific objections
relating to the proposals contained within the revised standard. In line with
Young (2014), the due process objections raised against the project were
30Although the financial crisis was a serious factor in making the publication of the
revised standard difficult.
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viewed by the IASB as part of an overall objection to the shift towards
fair value. They could thereby be seen as lacking in “purity” due to their
grounding in political rather than conceptual or technical factors.
In questioning the extent to which theories of social psychology can throw
light on the IASB’s decision-making processes and its effect on regulatory
outcomes, this paper is merely touching on what appears to be a promising area
for future research. Further work could examine occasions when group effects
or internal lobbying have enabled the publication of unpopular standards.
In addition, they could analyse group dynamics over time or for different
standard setting agencies cross-jurisdictionally. Finally, the effectiveness of
new agenda-setting procedures introduced in 2014 by the IASB to combat
the kinds of problems seen in the case of the Liabilities Project could usefully
be examined.
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A. Chronology of IAS 37 and the Liabilities Project
History of IAS 37 
 
August 1997 Exposure Draft E59 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets 
September 1998 IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets 
July 1999 Effective date of IAS 37 (1998) 
May 2003 Discussed at IASB meeting 
May 2004 Discussed at IASB meeting 
September 2004 Discussed at IASB meeting 
October 2004 Discussed at IASB meeting 
December 2004 Discussed at IASB meeting 
May 2005 Discussed at IASB meeting 
June 2005 Exposure Draft of substantial revisions to IAS 37 
February 2006 Discussed at IASB meeting 
March 2006 Discussed at IASB meeting 
May 2006 Discussed at IASB meeting 
June 2006 Discussed at IASB meeting 
July 2006 Discussed at IASB meeting 
September 2006 Discussed at IASB meeting 
October 2006 Discussed at IASB meeting 
November and 
December 2006 
Round-table discussions  
January 2007 Discussed at IASB meeting 
March 2007 Discussed at IASB meeting 
April 2007 Discussed at IASB meeting 
May 2007 Discussed at IASB meeting 
July 2007 Discussed at IASB meeting 
October 2007 Discussed at IASB meeting 
December 2007 Discussed at IASB meeting 
February 2008 Discussed at IASB meeting 
April 2008 Discussed at IASB meeting 
May 2008 Discussed at IASB meeting 
December 2008 Discussed at IASB meeting 
April 2009 Discussed at IASB meeting 
June 2009 Discussed at IASB meeting 
July 2009 Discussed at IASB meeting 
October 2009 Discussed at IASB meeting 
November 2009 Discussed at IASB meeting 
December 2009 Discussed at IASB meeting 
January 2010 Re-exposure of proposed revisions to Exposure Draft 
March 2010 Discussed at IASB meeting 
April 2010 Staff paper on application of Re-exposure draft to law suits 
June 2010 Discussed at IASB meeting 
 
Figure 1: Chronology of IAS 37 1997 to 2010
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B. Interviews conducted
KEY:
• IASB - International Accounting Standards Board
• ICAEW - Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
• CFA UK - Chartered Financial Analysts Institution
• ASB - Accounting Standards Board, UK.
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Organisation Name Position during
project
Date of Inter-
view
IASB Interviewee-14 Former Board
Member
February 2015
Big Four Auditing
Firm
Interviewee-13 Applicant for IASB
Staff Position
November 2014
IASB Interviewee-12 Technical staff November 2014
IASB Interviewee-11 Technical Staff April 2014
IASB Interviewee-10 Technical Staff June 2013
IASB Interviewee-9 Technical Staff August 2011
IASC Interviewee-8 Former Board
Member
May 2011
IASB Interviewee-7 Former Board
Member
January 2011
IASB Interviewee-6 Former board
member
December 2010
and March 2015
ICAEW Interviewee-5 Technical Staff August 2010
CFA UK Interviewee-4 Financial Report-
ing and Analysis
Committee
August 2010
ASB/Big four
audit firm
Interviewee-3 ASB member,
ICAEW Financial
Reporting Faculty,
Partner of Big 4
audit firm
August 2010
IASB Interviewee-2 Board Member March 2010 and
May 2010
ASB Interviewee-1 Research Staff February 2010
Table 1: Interviews conducted between 2010 and 2015.
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C. Figures
C.1. Figure 1
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C.2. Figure 2
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C.3. Figure 3
IASB Meeting, April 2014,  Agenda Paper 13A 
 
The standard-setting process 4 
Discussion 
Paper 
Exposure 
Draft Final IFRS 
Standards programme Implementation 
Proposal IFRIC 
2001 to 2006 
April 2014 Research Programme   
Figure 3: Agenda setting procedures at IASB 2001-2006. Source: IASB
Meeting, April 2014, Agenda Paper 13A, The Research Programme
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C.4. Figure 4
End of term Name Vote:
ED
(2010)
Vote
ED
2005
June 2010 R. Garnett For For
June 2010 G. Gelard For For
June 2010 J. Leisenring For For
June 2009 T. Jones n/a For
June 2009 M. Barth n/a For
June 2007 H. Bruns n/a For
June 2007 A. Cope n/a For
June 2007 P. O’Malley n/a For
June 2006 G. Whitting-
ton
n/a Against
Figure 4: Board changes during the Project
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C.5. Figure 5
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C.6. Figure 6
IASB Meeting, April 2014,  Agenda Paper 13A 
 
The standard-setting process 6 
Discussion 
Paper 
Exposure 
Draft Final IFRS 
Standards programme Implementation 
Proposal IFRIC PIR 
Request for 
Information 
Agenda Consultation 
3-5 year 
plan 
2011 
April 2014 Research Programme   
In 2011 the Trustees introduced the three-yearly public Agenda 
Consultation. 
 
Figure 6: Agenda setting procedures at IASB post-2011. The elements
highlighted using the red ellipse were newly added to the overall agenda-
setting process. Source: IASB Meeting, April 2014, Agenda Paper 13A, The
Research Prog a me
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